Improving Biological Security

Perspective

Biological terrorism poses several challenges. The overall number of weaponizable agents is large. The genetic variation of each agent is unknown. The capacity to select and engineer particularly virulent and resistant agents is real.

Phases

Managing the threats posed by biological terrorism can be seen in three phases. The response phase involves getting our neglected public health infrastructure, emergency medical services, hospitals, and doctors better prepared for natural outbreaks and man-made events. The deterrence phase involves putting rogue countries and organizations on notice that, if their weapons are ever used against us, we will pinpoint their origin and act with guaranteed force. The prevention phase involves getting federal law enforcement and national security agencies to assume a more proactive role in biological security. The response phase is the least difficult to implement. The deterrence and prevention phases are the most difficult and require new efforts to monitor suspicious persons within our boarders and increased human intelligence operations abroad.

Rapid Information

Speed is essential for dealing with biological terrorism. In responding to attacks, rapid information will help to save lives. In deterring and preventing attacks, rapid information will help to guide national security decisions.

Scientific Foundations

Like the human genome, the complete DNA sequence of germs such as anthrax has been published. A practical solution to the biological security problem takes advantage of such scientific knowledge and the fact that different strains of anthrax are readily identifiable with molecular fingerprinting technology.

Technologic Foundations

The technology exists to create a new kind of high-speed laboratory and forensic database against weaponizable germs like anthrax. With it, we could fingerprint hundreds of useful molecular markers for several thousand samples each day. Because the high-speed laboratory would test so many germ samples, its database would lead to a comprehensive family tree of how samples genetically relate to one another. And evidence suggests that molecular fingerprinting could be used for most, if not all, weaponizable or "select agents" identified by Congress.

Timing and Use

A demonstration version of the high-speed laboratory for biological security could be built within one year. A fully operational version that permits high-volume testing could be built within three years. The laboratory could serve public health, medical research, law enforcement, and national security agencies and function in part like an international biological defense sentinel.

Cost

The demonstration version will cost $5 million to build. The first fully operational version will cost $50 to build and an equal amount to operate over several years. In comparison, responding to a handful of anthrax letters that caused five deaths and a dozen or so hospitalizations has cost the United States billions of dollars over several months.

July 2002